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Copyright Protection: The Erosion of
Renewal Rights Under the Copyright Act of
1909
Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted
sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1989)
(No. 88-2102).
A recent decision construing the Copyright Act of 1909 has
created a conflict between two of the United States Courts of Ap-
peals concerning the rights of owners of copyright renewals in orig-
inal works vis-a-vis the rights of those who own a copyright in de-
rivative works based on the original works. In Abend v. MCA,
Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that rights attendant to a copyright in the original work, when
renewed by a party other than the original author, may negate any
further right of renewal of the copyright in the derivative work.
This decision is contrary to the Second Circuit's opinion in
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.2 which held that derivative works
constitute "new property" and, as such, their continued exhibition
during the renewal term of the underlying work cannot be defeated
by the failure of the original author, as opposed to his successor in
interest, to secure the renewal copyright in the original work. On
October 2, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari to review Abend and resolve this conflict.
The discord between the Ninth and the Second Circuits re-
sults from their reaching starkly different conclusions when each
endeavored to reconcile two provisions of the Copyright Act of
1909-specifically, section 24, which purports to grant the owner of
a derivative copyright, or his statutory successors, a right of re-
newal, and section 7, which' provides that-the publication of deriva-
tive works shall not affect the force or validity of any copyright in
the original work.' The specific issue before the Supreme Court is
1. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 58
U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1989) (No. 88-2102).
2. 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
3. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), substantially
revised the federal copyright framework. However, the Abend litigation is governed exclu-
sively by sections 7 and 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1470-72. Prior
to the 1976 revision, the applicable statutory provisions were codified at 17 U.S.C. § 24 and
17 U.S.C. § 7. Section 24 provided for a copyright term of twenty-eight years from the date
1
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whether, under section 24, the fortuitous death of the author of an
original work, and the subsequent renewal of that author's copy-
right by his statutory successor, extinguishes the right of an owner
of a duly copyrighted derivative work, provided for in section 7, to
continue exhibiting and distributing the work during the renewal
term of the underlying work.4 In construing the statutory language,
the Court must decide whether the provisions of sections 7 and 24
of the 1909 Act can be reconciled to adequately protect the inter-
ests of both the author of the original work, or his statutory suc-
cessor, and the owner of the derivative material.
Abend v. MCA, Inc. originated when the owner of the renewal
copyright in the story It Had to be Murder brought suit for copy-
right infringement against the owners of the rights to the film clas-
sic Rear Window, because of the re-release of Rear Window in the-
aters, on television, and on videocassette.' It Had to be Murder,
authored by Cornell Woolrich, was first published in 1942. In
of first publication, and further:
That in the case of any other copyrighted work ... the author of such work, if
still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not
living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the
author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to
a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of
twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have
been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year
prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright ....
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). Section 7 allowed the copyright holder in a work to authorize the
creation of derivative works and then permitted the creator of the derivative work to obtain
a copyright in the new work. Specifically, section 7 provided:
Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, trans-
lations, or other versions of works in the public domain or of copyrighted works
when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works
... shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of
this title; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or
validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part
thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original
works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works.
17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
4. 58 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Aug. 8, 1989).
5. 863 F.2d at 1467.
6. Id. It Had to be Murder was published in Dime Detective Magazine, whose pub-
lisher obtained a blanket copyright on that issue. Id. The defendants initially had moved for
summary judgment based on alleged defects in the story's copyright. Id. The defendants
alleged that Woolrich did not register individually any copyright in his story and thus the
work was ineffectively copyrighted; however, the court concluded that, under the 1909 Act,
first publication in a collective work under a "blanket" copyright notice in the name of the
periodical publisher was sufficient to secure the author's copyright in the work. Id. at 1469-
70. The defendants further alleged that the renewal copyright was defective because only
the magazine publisher had the right to renew the "blanket" copyright which initially pro-
tected the story. Id. at 1470 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the
[Vol. 7:167
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1945, Woolrich agreed to assign the rights to make a motion pic-
ture version of his story to B.G. DeSylva Productions, from whom
the defendants acquired the movie rights.7 At the same time,
Woolrich also agreed to renew the copyright in his story at the ex-
piration of the original term in 1969 and then assign to DeSylva
the same movie rights for the twenty-eight year renewal term.' In
1954, the motion picture Rear Window, based on Woolrich's story,
was produced and distributed by Paramount Pictures.9
In 1968, one year prior to the commencement of the renewal
term of the copyright in his story, Woolrich died leaving no surviv-
ing spouse or child.'0 His executor, Chase Manhattan Bank, re-
newed the copyright in the story in 1969, pursuant to section 24 of
the Copyright Act, and later assigned the renewal copyright to the
plaintiff Abend." In 1982, the defendants made a timely renewal
of their copyright in Rear Window." .A-bend brought suit in 1983
when the defendants, relying on the Second Circuit's 1977 ruling in
Rohauer,13 authorized the re-release of Rear Window."'
motion, holding that the plain language of section 24 and its legislative history gave "the
author of a contribution to a periodical a right of renewal with respect to that contribution,
even when the author has not separately copyrighted the contribution." Id. at 1472.
Defendants also had moved for summary judgement based on their affirmative defense
of "fair use." Id. at 1468. The district court granted the motion, but the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the defendants' actions were "a classic example of an unfair use: a
commercial use of a fictional story that adversely affects the story owner's adaptation
rights." Id. at 1482.
7. Id. at 1467.
8. Id.
9. Rear Window was directed by Alfred Hitchcock and starred Grace Kelly and




12. Id. at 1483 (Thompson, J., dissenting)
13. Rohauer involved the 1926 film The Son of the Sheik, based on a novel written by
Edith Maude Hull. Rohauer v. Killian Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 949 (1977). In 1925, after the novel's publisher assigned the valid U.S. copyright to
Hull, Hull sold all the motion picture rights to the story to Joseph Moskowitz. Id. Mrs. Hull
also agreed to renew the copyright prior to its expiration and then to assign to Moskowitz
the motion picture rights for the renewal term. A motion picture based on the novel was
produced and the picture was registered in the Copyright Office by an assignee of Mosko-
witz. Id. The copyright in this derivative work was renewed in 1954, and ultimately was
assigned to the defendant Killiam Shows, Inc. Id. Hull died in 1943 prior to the expiration
of the original copyright term. Id. In 1952, her daughter renewed the copyright in the novel
and, in 1965, assigned her rights in the motion picture and "all television rights of every
kind" to the plaintiff Rohauer. Id. In 1971, after the motion picture was shown on television,
Rohauer brought suit against Killiam Shows, Inc., alleging copyright infringement. Id. at
486-87. Rohauer claimed "that upon the expiration of the original term of the copyright in
the novel and Miss Hull's succession to the renewal term, all rights of the defendants and
their predecessors to authorize the exhibition of the motion picture terminated." Id. at 487.
19891
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The Ninth Circuit in Abend took issue with the Rohauer
court's opinion, especially the court's adoption of the "new prop-
erty" theory."' In discussing the application of this theory, the Sec-
ond Circuit had reconciled sections 7 and 24 of the 1909 Act and
held:
[W]e do not believe, despite language in the cases to the effect
that the proprietor of a derivative copyright is "protected" only
as to the "new matter" conceived by him and that a statutory
successor obtains a "new estate" in the underlying copyright,
that the vesting of renewed copyright in the underlying work in
a statutory successor deprives the proprietor of the derivative
copyright of a right, stemming from the § 7 "consent" of the
original proprietor of the underlying work, to use so much of the
underlying copyrighted work as already has been embodied in
the copyrighted derivative work, as a matter of copyright law.'"
In response the defendants claimed
that while after the expiration of the original term of the copyright in the novel
and the daughter's succession, no new motion picture versions could lawfully be
made on the basis of the 1925 grant from Mrs. Hull, their predecessors and they
were entitled to renew the copyright on a film already made and copyrighted
and to authorize its exhibition.
Id.
The Second Circuit, in holding that the defendants did not infringe the copyright in the
novel, relied on the "new property" theory, which states that when the author of an original
work gives consent to the creation of a derivative work, a "right of property [springs] into
existence, not at all affected by the conveyance of any other right." Id. at 493 (quoting
Edmonds v. Stern, 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918) (concluding that the owners of a derivative
copyright in an orchestral arrangement of a song had a property right "wholly separate and
independent" from the property right in the underlying song)).
14. 863 F.2d at 1468.
15. Id. at 1473.
16. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 492. In discussing the application of the "force and validity"
clause found in section 7 of the 1909 Act, the Second Circuit believed that this language did
not bear on the issue facing the court. Id. at 489-90. The significance of section 7 in the
Rohauer context focused on the concern that "recognition of derivative copyright might
extend the duration of the copyright in the original work." Id. at 489. The Second Circuit
adopted the view submitted by the defendants in that case that
sufficient "force" is given to the renewal copyright on the novel if it is held to
prevent any new or "second generation" derivative works, without going to the
extent of holding that the owner of the derivative copyright may not "print,
reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work" represented by the deriv-
ative copyright ....
Id. at 488.
In the Ninth Circuit, Abend argued that the defendants' exploitation of Rear Window
impaired the "force and validity" of the copyright in It Had to be Murder, in violation of
section 7. 863 F.2d at 1474 n.8. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it need not decide how the
"force or validity" clause affected the issue because Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Dan-
iels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960), which held that statutory successors to renewal copyrights
take free and clear of all purported assignments of the renewal rights, controlled the facts of
the case. 863 F.2d at 1474 n.8.
[Vol. 7:167
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The defendants in Abend argued that they had a right to continue
to exploit Rear Window during the twenty-eight year renewal
term, without regard to Abend's ownership of the renewal in the
underlying story, because Cornell Woolrich manifested his consent
to assign to their predecessors in interest the motion picture rights
in the story for the renewal term."
The Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of Rohauer because
it felt that, in reaching its decision, the Second Circuit had disre-
garded the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller Music Corp. v.
Charles N. Daniels, Inc.'s In Miller Music, the Court held that an
assignment of copyright renewal rights by an author prior to the
time for renewal could not defeat the right of an author's statutory
successor to the renewal when the author died before the time for
renewal had accrued.' In strictly construing section 24, the Court
found that Congress intended to establish a hierarchy of people
granted renewal rights, and that "[a]n assignment by an author of
his renewal rights made before the original copyright expires is
valid against the world, if the author is alive at the commence-
ment of the renewal period.""0
In further interpreting section 24, the Miller Music Court
found that when an author assigned renewal rights prior to the re-
newal term, contingency interests were created:
2'
Until [the renewal period] arrives, assignees of renewal rights
take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest in their
assignors. A purchaser of such an interest is deprived of nothing.
Like all purchasers of contingent interests, he takes subject to
the possibility that the contingency may not occur.2"
The Ninth Circuit, literally applying the Supreme Court's lan-
17. Id. at 1472.
18. 362 U.S. 373 (1960). Miller Music involved a song composed by Ben Black and
Charles Daniels, who assigned it to Villa Moret, Inc., which secured the original copyright.
Id. Prior to the expiration of the renewal term, Black assigned his renewal rights to Miller
Music, Inc. Id. at 373-74. Black died before effecting the renewal, and his brother, as execu-
tor, renewed the copyright pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 24. Id. at 374. Daniels acquired the
renewal copyright from Black's brother. Id. Miller Music then sued Daniels for copyright
infringement. Id. The dissenting judge in Abend insisted that, in assessing the applicability
of Miller Music to this case, one must realize that Miller Music, unlike Abend and Rohauer,
involved only one valid copyright. Abend, 863 F.2d at 1484 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("By
contrast here, as in Rohauer, two separately copyrighted works, each capable of being re-
newed . . .are involved.").
19. Miller Music, 362 U.S. at 373.
20. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 377-78.
22. Id. at 378.
19891
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guage, found that, because Woolrich died before the commence-
ment of the renewal term in his story, his assignment to the de-
fendants' predecessors in interest was ineffective and the most the
defendants could have acquired from the transaction was an expec-
tancy to exploit It Had to be Murder during its renewal period.2 3The Rohauer court had dismissed Miller Music as concerning
only the competing rights of persons claiming full assignment or
ownership of the renewal term of the underlying copyright, and
not, as the Second Circuit pointed out, the "proper reconciliation
between the grant of derivative copyright in § 7 and the final pro-.
viso of § 24 with respect to renewals of underlying copyrights."'"
The Ninth Circuit, justifying its reliance on Miller Music, was of
the view that since the Supreme Court in Miller Music had made
assignments of renewal rights in underlying works unenforceable
when the author died prior to effecting renewal, then an assign-
ment of part of the right in the underlying work, the right to cre-
ate a motion picture version, also must be ineffective if the author
died prior to commencement of the renewal period.2 5
The Abend dissent believed this distinction was flawed.2 Fun-
damentally disagreeing with the majority's view that Miller Music
controlled, the dissent instead relied on Rohauer, which involved
two works, each renewable under section 24. For the dissenting
judge in Abend, the pertinent issue to be resolved, therefore, was
not which of two parties had renewal rights in one copyrighted
work (the issue in Miller Music), but rather whether future exhibi-
tion of Rear Window (the copyrighted derivative work) was an in-
fringement of the renewal copyright in It Had to be Murder (the
copyrighted underlying work).21 In essence, he felt the court was
being asked "to reconcile the interests of two parties who both
have rights under the 1909 Act."
28
In construing the language in section 7 of the 1909 Act that
provides that derivative works "shall be regarded as new works
subject to copyright under the provisions of this title,"29 the dis-
23. 863 F.2d at 1475.
24. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
949 (1977).
25. 863 F.2d at 1476.
26. Id. at 1484 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis in original). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Thompson clearly
noted that "[tihe defendants do not challenge Abend's right to publish the story, nor do
they claim a right to publish it themselves; they do challenge Abend's ability to block their
right to show their film or to participate in its profits." Id.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970).
(Vol. 7:167
6
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 10
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/10
ABEND v. MCA, INC.
sent asserted that this provision granted derivative works "dignity
equal to underlying works."30 The dissenting judge reasoned that
because each of the works in question in Abend was capable of
renewal under the 1909 Act, the fact that Woolrich died before the
beginning of the renewal period did not hinder the defendants'
ability to exhibit their movie.$' Concurring with the Rohauer court,
the dissent stated that it "would not make sense" to deprive the
owner of a derivative copyright, who had obtained the consent of
the proprietor of the underlying copyright, from continued ex-
ploitation of his work simply because the renewal copyright in the
underlying work had vested in the statutory successor of the origi-
nal owner, instead of in the original owner himself32 In the eyes of
the dissenting judge, what the defendants lost when Woolrich died
before the commencement of the renewal term was not the right to
continue exhibiting Rear Window.33 Rather, they lost only the
right to create a new movie based on It Had to be Murder.3"
In addition to statutory construction, the dissent disagreed
with the majority insofar as equitable policy considerations were
concerned. The majority had found that Rohauer focused on the
unfairness to owners of derivative works without taking into ac-
count the Congressional policies behind section 24 that favored the
author of the underlying work."3 The majority had expressed its
belief that Congress enacted section 24 for the purpose of provid-
ing authors with a "second chance" to profit from their works. 6
The court reasoned that, because of their inability to predict how
successful the exploitation of a derivative work may be, authors of
original works have no opportunity to benefit from the work's suc-
cess; in the majority's estimation, section 24 was designed to pre-
vent such a result.3 7 The dissent argued, however, that the policy
of allowing authors to "reap benefits" from their own works was
30. 863 F*2d at 1484 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1487.
32. Id. at 1484, 1485.
33. Id. at 1487.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1477. The majority articulated what it believed to be the primary goals of
Congress in enacting section 24. First, the court claimed that "Congress sought to provide
authors with a 'second chance' to reap the benefits of their work, particularly since authors
must often negotiate from an unequal bargaining position." Id. Second, the court felt that
"Congress intended to provide protection to the author's family and so extended the re-
newal right to include the author's surviving family or heirs, should the author die during
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not thwarted by following Rohauer.ss The dissenting judge argued
that Abend, for example, was in fact free to capitalize on the suc-
cess of Rear Window by authorizing a new movie or television
show, or by creating book cassettes, as long as he did not infringe
upon the "new matter contained in [Rear Window]."39
Furthermore, the dissent objected to the majority's strict in-
terpretation of section 24 on other grounds. As pointed out by the
Second Circuit, if the 1909 Act were to be strictly construed, pur-
chasers of rights to derivative works would have no effective way to
protect themselves against the author's death before the com-
mencement of the renewal period.'0
The Abend dissent adopted the Second Circuit's conclusion
that it was "more in keeping with the letter and purposes of the
[the 1909 Copyright Act]" not to limit exhibition of the derivative
work.41 The dissenting judge concluded that Rohauer, not Miller
Music, offered that protection for proprietors of derivative works,
and finding in favor of the defendants in Abend, who are "as-
sertling] the right to exhibit their own protected work,' 2 would
not thwart Congressional intent nor besmirch fundamental policies
of fairness.
CONCLUSION
The issue that the Ninth Circuit faced in Abend v. MCA, Inc.
is by no means an insignificant one. Consequently, the Supreme
Court's treatment of the case will have ramifications far exceeding
the actual facts of the case. Although the Copyright Act of 1909
was revisited and amended by Congress in 1976, its impact and
validity in copyright law is still present, as Abend poignantly indi-
cates. The remedy. provisions of the 1976 Act apply to infringe-
ments occurring only after 1977,"a but other provisions of the 1909
38. Id. at 1487 (Thompson, J., dissenting). As was pointed out by the Second Circuit
in Rohouer, "[a] court must grope to ascertain what would have been the thought of the
1909 Congress on an issue about which it almost certainly never thought at all." Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977). The
Second Circuit had reasoned that creators of derivative works, unlike assignees or licensees,
make their own creative contributions of the type Congress sought to protect under copy-
right law. Id. at 493. The Rohauer court concluded, and the Abend dissent agreed, that such
a rationale "is more in keeping with the letter and purposes of the statute as best we can
discern them." Id. at 486.
39. 863 F.2d at 1487 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
40. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
41. Id. at 486.
42. 863 F.2d at 1485 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
43. 863 F.2d at 1479 n.19 (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754
[Vol. 7:167
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Act still permeate the amended version and are thus susceptible to
varying interpretations even today.
If the Supreme Court adopts the strict constructionist stance
of the Ninth Circuit and rules according to its own mandate in
Miller Music, the result could leave current and prospective pur-
chasers of rights to create derivative works in a precarious position
because, in fact, they only would be acquiring a contingency inter-
est in the right. It remains to be seen whether such a ruling would
deter those with the necessary resources and talent from seeking
out authors of original works, or, on a broader scale, stifle the ini-
tial production of educational and entertaining works.
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that Congress' intent underly-
ing section 24 was to provide authors with a second chance to ben-
efit from the success of the derivative work; however, if prospective
purchasers of derivative works contemplate that the risk that the
author may die before the renewal term commenced was a signifi-
cant one, many creators may refuse to attempt to enter into agree-
ments to create derivative works. Such a result would not even
provide authors with a first chance to reap any benefits from sell-
ing the derivative right, let alone satisfy the Ninth Circuit's "sec-
ond chance" rationale.
Todd G. Scher*
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979)). In Abend, the Ninth Circuit discussed
the remedies available to Abend as a result of the infringement. Abend first sought an in-
junction against the continued exploitation of Rear Window. 863 F.2d at 1479. Because it
would foreclose the defendants "from enjoying legitimate profits derived from exploitation
of the 'new matter' comprising the derivative work," the Ninth Circuit noted that injunctive
relief was not proper in this scenario. Id. The court instead recommended monetary com-
pensation, provided for in 17 U.S.C § 504(b) (1988). Id. The dissenting judge, in discussing
the majority's remedy analysis, states that the "share-the-wealth" concept recommended by
the court "offends my sense of justice," and that Abend should not "be permitted to squeeze
the defendants for money generated by a movie which they created, in which they risked
their capital, and to which they committed their substantial talents." Id. at 1487.
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